ERAU Human Factors Issue UAS


Although some unmanned aerial systems (UAS) ground control stations (GCS) are custom-made, large organizations may be provided GCS units that are built to specification.  The U.S military usually standardizes most of their GCS so that standardization can occur across operators (McHale, 2010). 

            In researching available data for this paper, it was evident that modern specific details of the most recent military-type GCS are not entirely available on the internet.  However, good design principles can still be discussed.  The “type” of GCS selected for this research is the container or office-based type and not the remote battlefield-based, man-type portable unit. These large, technologically advanced GCSs are the type utilized to control the Predator, Reaper and Global Hawk UAS systems.

            There are specific, human factors advantages to operators being based in GCS locations like military bases and U.S. office complexes.  Some of these “pros” include having operational control within a climate-controlled environment, availability of support resources (both human and hardware) and relief from battlefield physical and mental stressors (McHale, 2010). Another obvious advantage is the larger area on which to mount display screens.

            Despite these advantages, there are “cons” involved.  The larger, more complex stations are more vulnerable to design flaws (due to having additional controls).  An error in the development and implementation of standardized GCS can result in deeply rooted flaws in operation as compared to their custom-made counterparts.  This is because once a GCS type is placed into service for a large organization (such as the U.S. military), errors in design impact a larger number of pilots, sensor operators and numbers of sorties. Design errors can become deeply significant and more difficult to mitigate when introduced in large numbers (Carrigan, et al, 2006).

            Susceptibilities that may be present with the larger GCSs are evident in an accident analysis related to a Predator UAS crash in April, 2005 (Carrigan et al., 2006).  Given the brevity of this paper, a summary of the accident causes can be made here.  Contributing factors were noted to include design flaws between shared pilot and sensor operator controls, human resources failures regarding pilot supervision and hardware failures (signal drop).  Many of these root causes are similar those resulting in manned aircraft mishaps.  In fact, Carrigan et al attribute the Predator accident to a chain of events (like James Reason’s Swiss Cheese model) reminiscent of manned aircraft accidents (2006).

            It should be noted that human factors resulting in UAS accidents may have some origin in the aircraft’s design.  For example, a “soda straw” effect can limit the situational awareness (SA) of UAS pilots and sensor operators These limitations must be recognized and mitigated with additional capabilities and sensors that enhance SA (Austin, 2010).  One idea would be to establish a 360-degree field of view on top of the UAS that provides the pilot with visual cues in any direction.

            One new design is proposed by Haque, et.al (2017).  The researchers recommend supplying UAS operating personnel with additional information which will assist them in maintaining SA.  Importantly, more modern GCS designs and recommendations center on permitting more adjustment for personnel preferences during operation (Haque, et al, 2017). 

            Large GCS can be supplied in climate-controlled environments with software, hardware and human resources support.  These advantages should not mask the potential dangers involved which include lack of adherence to standard operating procedures, lack of system redundancies and a loss of SA that may not be present in GCSs that are operated by pilots who maintain visual line of sight (VLOS) with the UAS.
           
           
References

Austin, Reg. (2010). Unmanned Aircraft Systems UAVS Design, Development and Deployment.             Reston, Virginia: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc.

Carrigan, G., Long, D., Cummings, M & Duffner, J. (2006). Human Factors Analysis of Predator
            B Crash.  Retrieved from https://hal.pratt.duke.edu/sites/hal.pratt.duke.edu/files/
            u13/Human%20Factors%20Analysis%20of%20Predator%20B%20Crash%20.pdf

Haque, S., Kormokar, R. & Zaman, A. (2017).  Drone Ground Control Station with Enhanced
            Safety Features. Retrieved from https://ieeexplore-ieee-org.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/
            document/8226318/

McHale, J. (2010). Ground Control Stations for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Retrieved from
            https://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2010/06/ground-control-stations.html




Comments

Popular posts from this blog

The Value of Case Analysis

"Orientalism," a backbone of the United States drone program?

UAS Crew Member Selection